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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VSo 
BARBARA BRUNDAGE, RAY H. IVIE, 
and Jo RULON MORGAN, 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ Defendants-Respondents, ) 
) 
~ ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellanto 
Case Noo 18288 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an insurance arbitration action construing 
Section 31-41-11, U.C.A. 19530 Respondent Barbara Brundage brought 
a personal injury action against an insured of appellant Allstate 
Insurance Company, hereinafter Allstate, which was reduced to 
judgment in a prior caseo Respondents Ivie and Morgan, were Mrso 
Brundages attorneys in that earlier actione Respondent The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company, hereinafter Ohio Casualty, was Mrs. 
Brundage's no-fault insurero 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER-COURT 
The issue presented on appeal has been decided on at 
least four different occasions, in two different divisions of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court. On September 15, 1977, in the 
case of Brundage vs 0 Kernan (Civil No. 44997), Judge J. Robert 
Bullock ordered that the check representing special damages be 
made payable solely to respondent Brundage and her attorneyso 
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On November 18, 1980, in the case of The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company vso Barbara Brundage, et al (Civil Noo 47361), 
Judge George Eo Ballif granted respondent Brundage and her attor-
neys sunnnary judgment against respondent Ohio Casualty, claiming 
that Ohio's sole remedy was in arbitration with appellant Allstate 
Insurance Company~ 
On January 20, 1982, Judge Bullock denied a Rule 60(b) 
motion by appellant Allstate to amend the original verdict pursuant 
to a motion for relief from judgment in the prior action (Civil 
Noo 44997)0 This decision was based on res judicata, and a cons-
truction of Rule 60(b)o 
Appellant Allstate then cross-claimed against Brundage 
and her attorneys in Civil Noo 473610 This action was dismissed by 
Judge Ballif on the 18th day of January, 19820 
Although respondent Brundage and her attorneys were no 
longer before the Court, further motions of Allstate required 
Judge Ballif to reiterate the dismissal (in Civil No. 47361) on the 
27th day of January, 1982. 
No error has been assigned in Civil No. 44997, except 
as presented in Civil Noo 47361. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan would request the 
Court to dismiss Allstate's appeal as being untimely, governed by 
res judicata and collateral estoppel, and as an impermissible 
collateral attacko Respondent would also seek a denial of Allstate'i 
alternative relief, seeking reversal of the Court's order setting 
aside the dismissal of Ohio Casualty's complaint, in that Ohio 
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casualty, the real party in interest, never perfected an appeal on 
that ordero 
Respondent Brundage and her attorneys, would further ask 
that the Court uphold the orders of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, as being proper constructions of Section 31-41-11, u.c.A. 
19530 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the present action, appellant Allstate seeks relief 
from respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, stemming from a judg-
ment in the case of Brundage vso Kernan, on the 15th day of Septem-
ber, 19770 (R 20) 
In that action, Allstate represented the liability carrier 
in a personal injury action. After a verdict had been rendered in 
favor of plaintiff Brundage, the following dialogue took place 
between Mro Ray Harding Ivie, Mrso Brundage's attorney, and Mr. 
D. Gary Christian, an attorney for Allstate Insurance Company repre-
senting the tortfeasor, and the Court: 
''MR. IVIE: Your Honor, I would like to make a 
motion to the Court at this timeo There has been 
some guestion about subrogation, and I would like 
you to order the defendant in this case, the insu-
rance company, to make the draft only to my client 
and myself. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mro Christian? 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Well, your Honor, I think that Mro 
Ivie is entitled to thato I don't think that if I 
had any objection, it would be valid. 
- 3 -
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THE COURT: Well, then if I've got the authority 
to do so, that's what I'm going to do. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Well, Mrs o Brundage has a judgment 
against Mrs. Kernan. 
THE COURT: I guess if I don't have the authority, 
somebody upstairs can tell me. 
MR. CHRISTI.AN: I think she's entitled to have a 
draft made payable to her attorney without any other 
individual or company being names thereono I'd like 
to have the Court order me to do it that way, howevero 
THE COURT: That's the order o 
MRo CHRISTIAN: Thank youo 
THE COURT: And so I say, Mrs o Lambert will prepare 
the judgment on the verdicto 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Can it be recited in the judgments 
that the defendant is so order to pay that judgment? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank youo" 
(~hasis added) 
(R 232-234) 
As the foregoing dialogue indicates, Allstate, through 
their attorney Mro Christian, actually joined in the request for 
the ruling which Allstate now attempts to dispute. No error was 
ever assigned to this ruling, and Allstate made no action to attack 
it until over three years later, on the 9th day of February, 1981. 
On that date Allstate filed a cross-claim (R 121-122) in the instant 
action to hold Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys liable for those 
- 4 -
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funds which Mro Christian specifically requested be delivered to 
respondent at the conclusion of the original tort action. Also on 
February 9th, 1981, Allstate attempted to amend that original 
verdict with a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), 
in Civil Noo 449970 This latter attempt to attack the prior 
judgment was rejected by the original trial court on the 20th day 
of January, 1982, and no appeal was ever attempted or takeno There-
fore, that ruling is not properly before the Court. 
In addition, several facts are critical to the question 
of personal jurisdiction. The record indicates that on the 22nd 
day of December, 1980, respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan were 
granted a summary judgment against respondent and plaintiff below, 
Ohio Casualty, stating no cause for action. (R 104) The record 
will indicate that at this time, appellant Allstate had asserted 
no claims against respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan. 
Thereafter, Allstate filed a "cross-claim" against 
Brundage and her attorneys on the 9th day of February, 1981 (R 121). 
This claim for relief was mailed to the dismissed parties, and was 
never personally served. (R 123). 
Thereafter, no answer to the cross-claim, nor any further 
participation in the suit was made by respondent Brundage and her 
attorneys. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALLSTATE IACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS 
BRUNDAGE, IVIE AND MORGAN 
The instant suit was initiated by respondent Ohio Casualty, 
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against respondent Brundage. Thereafter, the original Complaint 
was amended to include Mrs. Brundage's attorneys Ivie and Morgan, 
as well as Allstate, the appellant herein. 
On the 22nd day of December, 1980, the Court below issued 
a judgment, dismissing respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, pur-
suant to a motion for summary judgment. The judgment recited that 
Ohio Casualty had "no cause for action." 
At the time of that judgment, appellant Allstate had 
asserted no claims against respondent Brundage and her attorneys. 
Thereafter, on the 9th day of February, 1981, Allstate asserted a 
"cross-claim" against Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys, who had 
previously been dismissed from the suit. This cross-claim was not 
personally served upon Mrs. Brundage or her attorneys. Rather, 
the record will indicate by the attached mailing certificate to 
the cross-claim that the new claim was merely mailed to an attorney 
for Mrs. Brundage, by a secretary in the offices of appellant's 
attorney. 
The record further indicates that thereafter, respondents 
Brundage, Ivie and Morgan refused to participate in the proceedingso 
No answer to the cross-claim was ever filed. No memorandum was 
ever issued. Indeed, respondents at all times following their 
initial dismissal on Summary Judgment, considered themselves non-
parties to the suit, in that once they had been dismissed, personal 
jurisdiction had never been acquired to nrandate their further parti· 
cipation. 
A. The Requirement for Personal Jurisdiction 
Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan would contend that 
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upon the granting of their sununary judgment and the subsequent 
dismissal from this suit, they became strangers to the action 0 
In effect, the granting of sunnnary judgment disposed of all 
claim which has been asserted against the respondents 0 
Rule 14(a) U.R.C.P. 1953 provides the appropriate 
guidelines for third-party practice. That rule provides: 
"At any time after connnencement of the action 
a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause 
a sunnnons and complaint to be served upon a eerson 
not a party to the action who is or may be liable 
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. 
against him." (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, once Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys were 
dismissed from the suit, and thus were no longer parties, the 
proper procedure for the assertion of new claims against them 
would have been in the form of a third-party complaint. Conversely, 
a cross-claim is only appropriate against a co-party to the suit. 
Rule 13(f) indicates: 
''A pleading may state as a cross-claim any 
claim by one party against a co-party arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter either of the original action or of 
a counterclaim therein or relating to any property 
that is the subject matter of the original actiono" 
It is respondents' conclusion that jurisdiction was 
never acquired by Allstate to present the claims which they 
currently bring upon appealo Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys 
became a non-party to the action upon their dismissal, and the· 
original claimant,. Ohio Casualty, made. no attempt.~ to;;.appeal the 
ordero Thereafter, the attempt to assert a claim against Mrso 
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Brundage, by merely mailing a copy of the cross-claim to her 
attorneys, was inadequate to gain jurisdiction for the purposes 
of Allstate's claim. 
The inadequacy of Allstate's service of process, is 
indicated in Rule 4(f) (2), requiring a court order for service 
by mail. That section provides: 
"ocoif the party desiring service of SUimD.ons shall 
file a verified petition stating the facts from 
which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely to give actual notice as service 
by publication, the court may order that service 
of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a 
copy of the sunnnons and complaint to the party 
to be served at his address, or his last known 
address. Service shall be complete ten days after 
such mailing." 
The record displays that proper service was never 
attempted on respondents following their dismissal from the 
suit. Therefore, respondents would respectfully urge the Court 
to base their decision in the current case on that lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
B. Appellant is precluded from contesting the Order of 
Smnmary Judgment Dismissing Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan. 
The preceeding analysis relates to appellant's procedural 
actions following the summary judgment dismissing respondents from 
the instant case. However, the record also indicates that appellant 
Allstate filed a notice of intent to appeal the decision granting 
Mrso Brundage's Motion for Sunnnary Judgment against Ohio Casualty. 
It is respondents' contention that Allstate is precluded on alternati 
grounds from appealing this judgment. 
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Initially, it must be noted that the only claims before 
the Court at the time of the judgment of dismissal were those of 
respondent Ohio Casualty. The judgment merely recited that Ohio 
Casualty had no cause of action against Mrso Brundage and her 
attorneyso At that time, no claim had been asserted by Allstate. 
Therefore, it would appear that Allstate has no standing to con-
test the dismissal of another parties' claim0 In Redwood Gym v. 
Salt Lake County Connnission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145, (Utah 1981), the 
Court stated: 
"This Court does not engage, in the rendering 
of advisory opinions. absent some overriding 
consideration of public policy, a party must 
demonstrate standing to raise an issue in order to 
secure a ruling thereono" 
It appears clear that Allstate does-not have standing 
to contest the order of Summary;Jti.dgmento No notice of intent 
to appeal was ever filed by the party whose claim was dismissedo 
Allstate's present request for a declaration of this Court that 
Ohio Casualty did have a valid claim against Mrso Brundage, is to 
~ allow a party to do indirectly what they could not do themselveso 
W Thus, Allstate's alternate relief for a declaratory judgment would 
l~i merely serve to avoid the strict requirements of appellate practiceo 
~1: Ohio Casualty accepted the dismissal of their claim without ever 
iii attempting to perfect their appeal,· and thus, th:e summary judgment 
1~i in favor of respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan should be consi-
' dered res judicatao 
- However, even if ·the Court upholds "che practice of 
appealing the dismissal of another parties' claim, an independent 
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reason exists for disallowing the appeal under the current circum-
stances o Respondents would contend that the relief requested is 
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaimo Appellant, not having 
raised that claim at the time of their initial pleading, nor seeking 
leave of Court to amend their responsive pleading, are now barred 
from requesting such relief. 
Rule 13(a) U.R.C.P. states: 
''A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the 
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does 
not require for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the 
time the action was commenced the claim was the subject 
of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party 
brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other 
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction 
to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the 
pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this 
Rule 130" 
Respondent interprets the foregoing language as requiring 
Allstate's current claims to be asserted as a compulsory counter-
claim under the statute. The claims asserted clearly arise out of 
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the initial Complaint against Allstate~ The claims also do not 
require the presence of third-parties of whom the Court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction for full adjudication. Furthermore, at the 
ti.me the action was commenced, the claim was not the subject of 
any other pending action, except possibly the original action 
against the tortfeasor, which respondents assert infra., was res 
judicatao 
- 10 -
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Therefore, the only question remaining is whether 
respondents were an opposing party at the time of Allstate's 
initial responsive pleading. Respondents believe that the 
issues raised by Allstate on this appeal are ample evidence 
of the opposing interests of Allstate and Brundage 0 Both prongs 
of Allstate's alternate request for relief are aimed at Brundage. 
Following Allstate 1 s initial pleading, a "cross-claim" was 
later asserted against Brundage. It is obvious that the interests 
of appellant and the respondent were adverse. 
It is a well settled rule of law that the initial 
caption of a case, or the alignment of the parties by the 
plaintiff, is not conclusive as to their opposing interesto See 
Swanson Vo Traer, 354 UoS• 114. For instance, in Federal 
practice, for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction, 
it is conmon for the Courts to realign the parties to reflect 
their opposing interests. See Pac. Railroad Co. of Missouri v. 
Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289. 
It is evident from the pleadings on file herein, that 
Allstate considered itself, even prior to the inception of this 
action, to be an opposing party with adverse interests from 
those of respondent Brundage. 
Respondents conclude therefore, that no jurisdiction 
was had on Mrs. Brundage following her dismissal from the action, 
and that Allstate should be precluded from appealing the dismissal 
of a claim in which they took no part. Respondents therefore 
consider their presence in the appellate Court a form of special 
appearance, and the remainder of their argument on appeal as 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
being merely an attempt to protect themselves under all 
eventualities, including the possibility that the Court may 
find personal jurisdiction has attached. 
POINI' II 
ALLSTATE 1 S APPEAL IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER 
In Point II, respondents contend that the relief 
sought by Allstate is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, timeliness for bringing an appeal, as an 
impermissible attempt to utilize divisions of the same Court 
to overrule decisions of fellow judges of the Court, and for 
mootness. 
It should be noted at the outset of this discussion 
that respondents have already presented underlying facts in the 
argument in the form of a ''Motion to Dismiss the Appeal," on 
the grounds of timelinesso That motion was denied by the Court 
on the 7th day of September, 1982, without discussion. Respondents 
once again assert the question of timeliness in Part D of this 
argument. If the Court is of the opinion that the issue of 
timeliness is foreclosed by the prior ruling on the motion, that 
section should be disregarded. However, in Parts A, B and C of 
the present analysis, respondents address the questions of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel, the propriety of asking 
one division of a Court to overrule another, and mootness of the 
appealo While these additional arguments are based on the same 
foundational facts as respondents' earlier motion, they present 
independent procedural rationales for rejecting the present appeal. 
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AG Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
As the facts on appeal indicate, the present controversy 
arises from an order of Judge Bullock in the case of Kernan vs
0 
Brundage, (Civil No. 44997), on the 15th day of September, 1977. 
That order was never appealed from and the issues remained dormant 
for over three years, until the 9th day of February, 1981. At that 
ti.me, Allstate brought a Motion to Amend the Original Judgment, as 
well as a cross-claim against respondent Brundage and her attorneys 
in a collateral action filed before Judge Ballif. That latter 
action is currently before the Court on appeal. 
Respondent would contend that the present appeal stems 
from an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment rendered 
by the trial court in the initial case of Kernan vs. Brundage. To 
this extent, respondent believes that the related doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppelpreclude Allstate from relitigating 
questions which were decided· in the earlier suito 
The distinction between these related doctrines was 
discussed in the case of Searle Brothers vso Searle, 588 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1978)0 There it was stated at page 690: 
"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits 
must involve the same parties or their privies and also 
the same cause of action; and this precludes the reliti-
gation of all issues that could have been litigated as 
well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior 
action. If the subsequent suit involves different parties, 
those parties cannot be bound by the prior judgment. 
Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from 
a different cause of action and prevents parties and their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second 
suit that were fully litigated in the first suito This 
means that the plea of collateral estoppel can be asserted 
only against a party in the subsequent suit who was also a 
party or in privity with a party in the prior suitG" 
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As the foregoing language indicates, a threshold question 
is presented where either res judicata or collateral estoppel is 
asserted. That question requires a finding that the party against 
whom the claim is asserted was either a party, or in privity with a 
party, in the prior actiono See Nielson vs. Droubay, Supreme Court 
Noo 17385 Utah, Filed July 20, 19820 
Respondent would urge that Allstate should be bound by the 
rulings of the trial court in the initial action against their in-
sured, on the grounds that they were at all times in privity with 
their insuredo It must first be noted that Allstate retained completE 
control of the litigation in the earlier action. They selected the 
attorney who represented their insured from inception to conclusion 
of the action. They were bound by contract to represent their 
insured, and to pay all sums which the Court ordered, up to their 
policy limit. Furthermore, when the motion was presented to make 
the check representing special damages payable only to Mrs. Brundage 
and her attorneys, the motion was addressed not to the insured but 
to the insurance company. (By reiteration, respondent Ivie requested 
of the Court at R-232: "There has been some question about subro-
gation. And I would like you to order the defendant in this case, 
the insurance company, to make the draft only to my client and myself 
In addition, respondent would content that special conside· 
rations unique to insurance cases demand that the insurer be held in 
privity with the insured in such situations. It is a well accepted 
principle of trial practice that an insurance company will not be 
named as a party to an action, despite the fact that they are ulti· 
mately responsible for the loss, and that they will control the 
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litigation from its inception. This principle is applied, despite 
the traditional rights given to a third-party beneficiary to a 
contract, in order to protect insurance companies from the potential 
prejudicial effects which their presence in an action may have upon 
a juryo It would be a highly unjust and inequitable result, should 
an insurer be allowed to use this limited protection as a means of 
escaping responsibility for their actions in conducting the litigation. 
In 46 C.J.S. Insurance 1252, the principle is articulated: 
''Where an insurer was notified of a pending action 
against the insured on an injury or liability covered 
by the policy, a judgment against the insured in such 
action is conclusive on the insurer as to all questions 
determined therein and material in an action against it 
on ~he policy; and the insured is also concluded as to 
matters established in such actiono" 
In Utah, several specific tests have been established to 
determine privity for purposes of res judicata and collateral estop-
pelo The Court in Tanner vso Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1943) 
stated that privity means "one whose interests has been legally 
represented at the time." In Searle Brothers vso Searle, supra, 
the Court stated: 
"The legal definition of a person in privity 
with another, is a person so identified in interest 
with another that he represents the same legal righto" 
Respondent would content that under the definitions and 
principl..es. oU'tlined above, Allstate must be held to be· in privity 
with their insured in the present situation. Certainly, Allstate 
being responsible for any potential judgment, represented the same 
legal right as their insured in the action. Their contractual right 
to retain the attorney of their choice in defense of the insured 
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would obviously indicate that their interest had been legally 
representedo See also Camppell vs. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037, 1040 
(Utah 1979)0 
Once Allstate's privity to their insured has been 
established, it is then necessary to apply the rules governing 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The elements of res judicata 
were articulated by the Utah Court in the case of Olsen vso Board 
of Education of the Granite School District, 571 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
1977)0 The Court indicated: 
"The parties thereto are concluded as to all 
matters that were put in issue, or might have been 
put in issue, or were necessarily implied in the 
decision ••• The doctrine renders a final judgment, on 
the merits, by a court of competent jurisdiction, con-
clusive upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent 
litigation of the same issues. 
The general rule of law is that a judgment may 
not be drawn in question in a collateral proceeding 
and an attack upon a ju4gment is regarded as collateral 
if made when the judgment is offered as the basis of a 
claim in a subsequent proceeding. 
The Restatement of Judgments (1942) Section 11, 
Comment A, defines a collateral attack as follows: 
Where a judgment is attacked in other 
ways than by proceedings in the original action 
to have it vacated or r~vised or modified or by 
a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforce-
ment, the attack is a "Collateral Attack." 
Applying the foregoing language to the facts at hand, 
respondents conclude (1) that the issue currently presented not 
only might have been put in issue, but was in fact; (2) the trial 
court's decision in the original action against the insured became 
a final judgment, on the merits, by a Court of competent jurisdic· 
tion; (3) that the present action is a collateral attack, within 
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the meaning of Olsen, supra, in that it was attacked in other ways 
than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or 
revisedo Furthermore, it is critical as to this latter point to 
note that Allstate also attacked the judgment in the original 
action, to have it vacated or revised 0 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is likewise applicable 
to the case at hando The Utah Supreme Court has recently upheld 
the requirement that collateral estoppel cannot be used as a sword 
against a party who was not present in the earlier litigationo See 
Nielson vs. Droubay, supra, However, privity dictates that this 
defense would only be available to Ohio Casualty, and not Allstateo 
Furthermore, Ohio Casualty initially filed an action against res-
pondent Brundage and her attorneys, but upon losing on Sumnary 
Judgment, failed to take any of the steps necessary to perfect an 
appeal. Therefore, collateral estoppel should be applicable in the 
instant case, regardless of the fact that a stranger to the proceedings 
is present. Allstate's privity in the earlier action is sufficient. 
The essential elements of collateral estoppel are indicated 
in Searle Brothers vs. Searle, supra, wherein the Court proposes 
three tests as being determinative: 
(1) was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in question? 
(2) was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) was 
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in 
privity with the party to the prior adjudication?" 
Respondent would maintain that the answer to all three 
of the above questions should be answered "yes"o The latter question 
has been addressed earlier in this pointo The first question is 
answered by examining the transcript of the original tort action, 
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where respondent Ivie identified the question as being subrogation, 
and moving for the exact relief which Allstate claims as error in th 
current actiono Question (2) has never been disputed by appellant 
or any other party. 
Finally, the Searle Court proposed a fourth test in applyi 
collateral estoppelo The final question remaining is: 
''Was the issue in the first case competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated?" 
Respondent believes that the answer is yeso The record 
will indicate that respondent Ivie clearly identified the issue 
presented by the motion as being one of subrogationo Thereafter, 
the Court left no doubts that it was willing to entertain any 
objections which Allstate's attorney, Mr. Christian, might choose 
to asserto Instead of objecting, Mro Christian actively joined in 
the request. Respondents conclude that the only inference which 
may be drawn from the motion in the earlier tort action, is that 
the Court provided every opportunity for Allstate to have a 
competent, full, and fair determination of the matter of which 
they now seek to contest five years latero 
Respondent believes therefore, that the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata clearly apply to bar the 
present actiono 
Bo The Functioning of Divisions Within the Court 
Respondent also believes that Allstate has improperly 
attempted to have one division of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court overrule another. In Point III of appellant's brief they 
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claim that: 
"In the event that trial court did not err 
in setting aside the judgment of dismissal in favor 
of Allstate, the court erred in not amending the 
personal injury ~udgment to reduce it by the amount 
of PIP payments. 1 
It is important to reiterate at this time that Allstate's 
assault on the original personal injury judgment-- occurred in two 
fonns of the Fourth Judicial District Court. Allstate brought an 
action-before the original judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b): Allstate 
also filed a cross-claim in the present action against Brundage, Ivie 
and Morgan, who had already been dismissed from that suit. 
In· the first action, Judge Bullock refused:to amend the 
judgment, on the grounds that it was not a clerical mistake, but 
a mistake o.f law, and therefore was not subject to modification at 
that late date. Allstate made no attempt to;- appeal this order, and 
indeed the record will indicate a complete vacuum as it relates to 
the attempt to amend the judgment before the original trial courto 
An examination of the cross-claim will also indicate that 
no attempt was made to amend the judgment there. Rather, the cross-
claim states: 
1. First cause of action: 
"Since the Court wrongfully ordered Allstate, 
through its insured Kerman to pay Brundage and her 
attorneys for damages wnic& Brundage had, heretofore, 
received no-fault benefits, and Allstate accordingly 
complied, cross-defendants Brundage and her attorneys 
are liable to Allstate in the amount of $6,651.04 •• o" 
2. Second cause of action: 
"Cross-defendants Brundage and her attorneys 
have been unjustly enriched ••• " 
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3o Third cause of action: 
"Cross-claimant seeks declaratory relief from 
the Court as to its rights under the law to be r.ro-
tected from paying twice for the same damageo'«> o ' 
Obviously, none of the relief prayed for in the cross-
clai.m requested the original trial court to amend the judgment. 
Rather, as the first cause of action clearly indicates, Allstate 
attempted to collect damages, by using Judge Ballif's Court to 
appeal the prior ruling of Judge Bullock. Nowhere is the request 
presented to amend the judgment itself o 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysiso 
First, the refusal of the Court to amend the personal injury 
judgment by the amount of PIP payments is not properly before the 
Court. At no ti.me did Allstate indicate their intention of 
appealing this matter. Second, Allstate's actions constitute an 
impermissible attempt to induce one division of the Fourth Judicial 
District to overrule anothero 
The respondentswould contend that Judge Ballif's deference 
to the earlier rulings of the Fourth Judicial District Court, sitting 
in its different divisions, was a necessary and proper application 
of judicial procedure. Initially, it must be noted, that divisions 
of the Court are established for the purposes of judicial convenience 
and efficiency, and are not so divided for the purposes of forum 
shopping or fortttn hopping. In 21 c.J.s. Courts, 137, 210, it is 
stated: 
''A court which is divided into divisions or 
departments remains a unit notwithstanding; actions 
brought in any of the departments are in effect in the 
same court, and decisions and ~udgments therein are 
rendered by the same tribunal. ' 
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The citation continues at 211, to indicate: 
"The court remains a unit notwithstanding such 
a division; and where the constitution vests the 
power in the court and not in departments which 
are merely for convenience, the judges hoid but one 
and the same court whether sitting separately or 
together. Actions brought in any of such depart-
ments are in effect in the same court, and decisions 
and judgments therein are rendered by the same 
tribunalo•o" 
Furthermore, the fact that an action is heard before 
different divisions of the same court, does not affect the prior 
decisions of a different judge. At 21 C.J.s. Courts, 137, 213 
it is stated: 
''A case originally assigned to one division or 
department may be transferred to another ••• but such 
transfer does not affect previous orders in the case 
made in the department to which it then belonged •• o" 
The reasons for the rules outlined above is readily 
apparento The constitution of this state, as well as our sister 
jurisdictions, provides for effective methods of appellate reviewo 
However, where a party attempts to·relitigate the same.issues in 
different divisions of a single district court, the ultimate 
result is a complete breakdown of finality, clarity, and consis-
tency in trial court determinations. 
Respondentswould urge that Judge Ballif 's rulings be 
upheld to the extent that they reflect a refu~al to overrule 
a different division of the.Fourth District Courto 
c. Allstate has Waived its Right to Appeal by Voluntary 
Paym.ent of the Judgment 
Respondents woul~ further contend that Allstate's 
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voluntary payment of the judgment in the initial action against 
their insured tortfeasor, constitutes a waiver of their r~ght to 
appeal. It is important to note at the outset, that respondent 
relies on the same considerations of an insurer's privity with 
their insured, that were argued under the res judicata analysis, 
above. Once that fact is established, Allstate's voluntary pay-
ment of funds representing special damages, serves as a waiver of th 
right to appeal the order of the Court which mandated the payment 
of those damageso 
This rule of law is rooted in several different legal 
foundations. In 39 ALR 2nd 157, it is stated: 
"In determining whether payment of, or 
compliance with, a judgment deprieves the defeated 
party of the right to appeal, the Courts proceed 
on various theories. They ascertain whether payment 
or performance of the judgment constitutes a waiver 
or estoppel, these terms sometimes being used inter-
changeably, or a release of errors, or an acquiessence 
in the judgment, or whether payment or performance 
renders the controversy moot." 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the general rule of 
law that payment of a judgment bars the right to appeal, founding 
their decision on the principle of mootness. In Hollingsworth vs. 
Farmers Insurance Company, et al, Supreme Court No. 17828, Utah, 
filed September 7, 1982, the Court_ stated: 
"Generally, when a judgment creditor accepts 
payment and executes a satisfaction of judgment the 
controversy becomes moot and the right of appeal is 
barred." 
See also Merhish vso H. A. Folsom & Associates, Utah 646 
P.2d 731 (1982); Clive vs. Mason, Utah 605 P.2d 763 (1980); and 
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Jensen Vo Eddy, Utah 514 Po2d 1142 (1973)
0 
In addition, while Hollingsworth would indicate that 
mootness is the touchstone of the doctrine, a parties' actions 
as constituting a waiver, also are significant. The decision 
stated: 
''Any intention IDS may have had to preserve 
the right of appeal is wholly inconsistent with 
its action. (in satisfying the judgment)." 
Therefore, respondent believes that the actions of 
Allstate's attorney in soliciting the ruling of Judge Bullock in 
the original tort action, should serve as a waiver of their right 
to appealo 
However, the Hollingsworth case also states: 
"The general rule does not necessarily prevent 
an appeal as to separate and independent claims if 
it is shown that a controversy remains in regard 
thereto." 
The nature of the claims in Hollingsworth, involved 
H money damages, as well as the rights to real propertyo Appellant 
~l accepted the award of money damages, while later choosing to appeal 
~ the question as to property rights. The Court there held that 
# these questions were not divisible, and thus review was mooto 
In stating that a judgment may become divisible, and thus 
subject to appeal despite partial satisfaction, the Hollingsworth 
Court cited the case of Jensen v. Eddy, Utah 514 P.2d 1142 (1973). 
In that case the Court indicated: 
·''We are in agreement with> the general rule that 
if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, 
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and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become 
moot and the right to appeal is waived. This is 
based upon the reasoning that when a controversy 
has come to rest the litigation should cease. But 
~ertinent to the problem here is an ancient aphorism: 
If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule 
does not apply.' Therefore, the general rule just 
stated does not usually prevent an appeal as to 
separate and independent claims where the controversy 
has not so come to rest. If a judgment is entered as 
to one part of a controversy which is separate and 
distinct from another part, and the disposition of 
the latter cannot affect the disposition of the 
former} a party may accept the money or property to 
which he is entitled, and not be deemed to waive his 
right to appeal as to other independent claims which 
the court refused to grant." 
Applying the above language to the instant facts, it 
becomes apparent that a division of the issues here would be 
inappropriate. First, it should be noted that Allstate did not 
pay some of the amount of damages, while preserving their right 
to appeal on others. Rather, they paid the entire judgment 
reflecting special and general damageso This occurred in full_ 
light of the language of respondent Ivie's motion, that a question 
as to subrogation existed. Further, the controversy here had come 
to rest. After Mrs. Brundage had received the compensation for 
her injuries, Allstate waited three years before relitigating the 
issue. 
Respondents would respectfully contend that the reasoning 
of Jensen Ve Eddy, supra, is controlling; ''That when a controversy 
has come to rest.litigation should cease." 
It is sincerely believed that when viewed through the 
spectacles of the private individual who might be compelled to pro· 
duce a large fund, stennning from a controversy which a reasonable 
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person would believe had become final, that the reason for the 
rule is undoubtedly present. 
D. Timeliness of the Appeal 
Respondents have earlier made a motion to dismiss 
the appeal on the grounds that it is untimely 0 This motion was 
denied by the Court without connnento Because respondents are 
uncertain as to the reason the motion was denied, the question 
is presented at this time, so that the Court may have the 
benefit of further consideration of the matter. However, should 
the Court be of the opinion that the denial of the motion is 
conclusive as to the issue, this portion of respondents' brief 
may be disregardedo 
In sunnnary, the facts upon which this argument is 
based are identical to the facts considered aboveo Respondents' 
contention is that the issue presented by Allstate on appeal 
is identical to the question presented to the original trial 
Court in the action against Allstate's insuredo 
It is respondents' position that if Allstate disagreed 
with the ruling in the original tort action, they should have 
appealed from that holding instead of waiting three years and 
attempting a collateral attack. 
Rule 73(a) U.RoC 5 P. 1953, requires: 
"When an appeal is permitted from a district 
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which 
an appeal may be taken shall be one month from 
from the entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from unless a shorter time is provided by law, 
ex_cept "that upon a showing -of excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn· of· the 
entry of the judgment the district court in any . 
action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 
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one month from the expiration of the original time 
herein prescribedo" 
Respondents believe that the failure of Allstate to 
satisfy the Rule 73 time limitations for appealing to this 
Court is evident from the face of the recordo 
POINT III 
APPELLANT ALLSTATE'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS THROUGH 
ARBITRATION. 
The issue which appellant Allstate seeks to litigate 
in the current appeal, is one which has been extensively before 
the Utah Court; ioeo an insurers right to subrogation under the 
Utah No-Fault Insurance Acto 
In order to properly evaluate the issue presented, 
it is necessary to put the facts of this case in a time frame 
of the judicial pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court. It 
must be noted that the initial trial against the tortfeasor 
as well as the subsequent payment to Mrs. Brundage of the damages 
assigned by the jury, occurred prior to the case of Allstate v~ 
~' Utah 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), and the subsequent decisions 
of the Court. 
However, it is of critical importance to note that all 
events which are the subject of this appeal occurred years after 
the case of Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 
(Utah, 1972). 
A. The Law Prior to Allstate vs. Ivie 
The Barnes case established the universal practice in 
cases of insurance subrogation, until the Ivie decision of 19800 
-26-
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The Barnes case articulated· 
. 
"If the settlement were intended to include 
plaintiff's prior medical expenses two drafts 
should have been issued, one to (i~surer) and 
(person receiving benefits) jointly and one to (that person), alone." (Modified) · 
The procedure of issuing two separate checks in satis-
faction of a personal injury claim, was utilized by virtually 
every liability insurer in the State of Utah. Indeed, this 
practice produced the precise controversy in Allstate v. Ivie, 
suprao Yet, as the records will indicate, Allstate readily 
agreed at the trial at the original tort action to issue a check 
to the insured alone, ignoring the rights of her no-fault insurer. 
This occurred even though Mrs. Brundage's attorney prefaced his 
motion with the statement that a subrogation issue existed. 
This latter fact is critical.when viewed through the 
spectacles of Transamerica v. Barnes• supra.· The Barne-s case made it 
clear that where the liability insurer has notice of a subrogation 
interest, and yet fails to issue,the two separate drafts, they 
are guilty of a fraud upon the subrogated insurer and are liable 
to that insurer despite any payment to the injured plaintiff. 
The Barnes decision states: 
"If the settlement were made with knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of plaintiff's subrogation 
right, such settlement and release is a fraud on 
the. insurer aad -will not affect·. the insurer 1 s right 
of subro ation as a ainst tfie tort-feasor or his 
insurance carrier. mp asis a 
At first blush, the language-in Barnes which requires 
r. ~: the .. liability~ insurer_,' to.~ make: a· dou9le '"payment --appea-E's" quite, hars ho::~ · 
However,. earlier in the decision .. Chief Justice ·Callister provides 
-27-
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the touch stone that justifies holding the liability insurer 
and not the injured plaintiff liable for this sum. The Chief 
Justice states: 
"Subrogation is not permitted where it will 
work any injustice to others. To entitle one to 
subrogation, the equities of one's case must be 
strong, as equity will, in general, relieve only those 
who could not have relieved themselves." 
In the instant case, it is clear that Allstate could 
have objected to the motion proposed by Mrs. Brundage's attorney, 
and therefore have protected their interest. Rather, they 
acquiessed in the motion and even requested that the Court make 
such an ordero It is beyond cavil that Allstate, through proper 
objections, could have relieved themselves by obtaining the 
same pragmatic remedy as they now seek five years after the factQ 
In his ciriticsm of the majorities opinion in Ivie, 
supra, Justice Crockett found this exact interpretation of 
Barnes, supra, to be controlling. ·The Justice stated: 
"In treating a similar situation in the case 
of Transamert,ca Ins. Co 2 y. Batnes, this Court 
stated that ~if the settlement were intended to 
include plaintiff's prior medical expenses, two 
drafts should have been issuedo One to plaintiff 
and defendant jointly and one to defendant alone.' 
That is the exact procedure followed by (the 
liability carrier) in this instance." 
Thus, it would appear that an even more compelling 
reason exists in the present situation than existed in Ivie, 
supra, where two checks were issuedo 
However, an interpretation of the above quoted 
!~ 
language still presents the question of whether or not Mrso Brundage 
would suffer a greater injustice than Allstate under these facts, 
-28-
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It is respectfully su.8mitted that Allstate, having an extensive 
nationwide network of professionals who deal exclusively in the 
area of insurance law, was in a far better situation to protect 
their interestso Furthermore, it is the inherent nature of the 
insurance industry to spread risks of monetary losses. 
Conversely, Mrs. Brundage is a single individual. 
Here sole connection to the insurance industry is being the 
unfortunate victim of a tortious drivero Her ability to spread 
the risk of loss extends from her purse to the cookie jar. 
Allstate may articulate the injustice of double 
liability. However, their-argument must be tempered by the 
injustice to the human condition which Allstate attempts to 
inflict. It is respectfully submitted that to require Mrso 
Brundage, more than five-years after.leaving.the Court of law, 
to produce the fund of thousands of dollars solely due to 
Allstate's failure to object, is repugnant to the very foundation 
of equi. ty. Mrs. Brundage is left only to' echo· the words of 
Barnes, supra: "Subrogation is not permitted where it will work 
any injus tlce to others." 
B. Allstate Vo Ivie Applied 
The law of insurance subrogation in the State of Utah 
was rewr~tten :by the adoption· of tJne.utah·No-Fault:Insurance 
Act. The Bar of the State of Utah underwent seven years of~ 
adjustment,. during which time Mrs o Brundage 1 s judgment. was 
rendered, until 1980 when the· Utah: Supreme· Court delive·red its ~ 
cpinion in Allstate v. Ivie, suprao -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Ivie case mirrors the current situation, with 
two important distinctions. First, making the check payable 
jointly to Mrs. Ivie and her no-fault carrier, was the unilateral 
act of the liability insurer, and not pursuant to Court order. 
Second, Mrs. Ivie's claim concluded with a settlement rather 
than a judgment of the Court. 
The initial distinction goes to the issue of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel, which is treated elsewhere 
in this brief. However, Allstate places great reliance in the 
second factual distinction. According to Allstate, the fact 
that special damages are easily discernable from an examination 
of the judgment supports their right to reinbursement. Allstate 
maintains that the Court's decision in Ivie, supra, was due 
solely to the Court's inability to discern what items the settle-
ment was intended to include. 
Initially, Mrs. Brundage-would suggest that this 
distinction is a double-edged sword. The judgment of the Court 
in the instant case is not only apparent to the Justices of 
this Court, it was undoubtedly crystal clear to Allstate's 
attorney at the trial against the tort-feasor. Thus, Allstate 
cannot claim as it is argued in ~' supra, that the ambiguity 
surrounding the payment of the claim contemplated satisfying the 
subrogation right of the.no-fault insurer. Allstate's failure 
to object once again raises the spector of fundamental principles 
of equity discussed in Barnes, supra. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Brundage would maintain that the 
Court in Ivie, supra, did in fact recognize the payment of special 
-~"-
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damages to the tort victim, but resolved the equities against 
the liability carrier, who is in the best position to prevent 
the situation which occurred. The Court stated: 
"Thus the tort victim's recovery from the 
liability insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP 
payments. If the victim's recovery be reduced 
by the amount of the PIP payments by granting his 
no-fault insurer a right of subrogation, it is the 
no-fault insurer who receives double recovery. This 
is so because the insurer receives a premium for 
the benefits, and then receives full reimbursement, 
while the liability insurance available to recompense 
the victim is depleted by payments for which the lia-
bility insurer is not responsible- to the victim.'' 
Respondents do not mean to suggest that the ~ case 
didn't provide that the tort victim should not seek to be compen-
sated for special damages already paid by the'PIP carrier. Had 
Mrs. Brundage's trial occurred three ·years later, after the deci-
sion in ~' supra, was announced, no such recovery would have 
been co.ntemplatedo However, it is respectfully submitted that 
the Court in ~' supra, chose to resolve the equities in favor 
of the private citizen and against the liability insurer, who was 
charged by statute to satisfy the myriad requirements of the Utah 
No· Fault Insurance Act. as a condition· ~precedent to doing business 
in this jurisdiction. 
That the Ivie Court was aware that the sum obtained by 
the tort victim included special damages, is clearly evidenced by 
the vigorous dissent of now Chief Justice Hall. Justice Hall 
stated at page 1205: 
~- t..<. '.'The .. pure and. simple facts of -this -case .are-· · ~ 0---- •• 
wholly supportive of the summary judgment appealed 
from. Ivie chose to compromise her claim against 
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the tortfeasor by accepting the sum of $44,000 in 
full settlement thereof o Prior to the settlement, 
(the liability insurer) duly advised Ivie of its 
intention to include (the no-fault carrier) on its 
settlement draft and thereby satisfy its statutory 
obligation to reimburse (the no-fault carrier) for 
its advance of $7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at 
the time of settlement, it issued a separate draft 
for the exact sum of said PIP payments ($7,394), 
payable jointly to Ivie and (the no-fault carrier)." 
(Modified) 
In referring to the dissent of Chief Justice Hall, 
respondent is well aware that thoughtful and well reasoned 
arguments exist in support of appellant's claimo However, in 
the event that the present Court wishes to lay down a new rule 
of law, respondent would respectfully request the Court to 
examine several important considerations. 
Initially, it should be noted that the tort victim in 
both ~' supra, and the present case, acted without the benefit 
of the Court's post-1980 pronouncements. Respondents would con-
tend that to treat two similarly situated litigants in a disparate 
fashion, would be an unfortunate inconsistency. It is respect-
fully contended that should the Court choose to reexamine !Y!!' 
supra, a better case would be presented by a post ~,supra, 
litiganto 
Furthermore, respondents believe that the liability 
insurer in the present case, is far less deserving of relief than 
the liability carrier in !Y!!:.,supra. As the Hall dissent indicates, 
the liability insurer there attempted to satisfy the rights of the 
no-fault's carrier by including it on the check that represented 
special damages. In the instant case, Allstate ac~~vely avoided 
such a method., 
i 
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Finally, if the above reasons are not persuasive, we 
would urge that the Court treat Mrso Brundage in the same fashion 
which Justice Hall urged the majority in ~' supra, to give to 
the liability carrier. Justice Hall concluded his dissent by 
stating: 
"•ooapplying the new rule of law in the 
present case eauses me c9nsiderablerconcern for 
it effects a highly unjust and harsh result. The 
majority would be better advised to abide by the 
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine" and thereby make 
the change in the law prospective only." 
(Emphasis in the original)o 
c. The Allstate vs. Ivie Progeny 
Respondent is also of the opinion that the pronouncements 
of the Utah Supreme Court following the-~ decision,- continue -
to support its position maintained on appeal • 
.. In Allstate Insurance Company vso Anderson, 608 ·Po2d .235 
(Utah 1980), an almost identical situation was presented. The insured 
received $2,000.00 in PIP benefits from its insurer, Allstateo The 
insured then brought an action against the tortfeasor which_ resulted 
in a $10,000.00 settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer. $2,000.00 
of the $10,000.00 settlement was made payable jointly to Allstate 
and the insured as reimbursement for the PIP benefits paid by 
Allstate. The insured tefused to deliver the draft to Allstate, and 
Allstate then sued for its recovery. The Court summarily granted 
judgment in favor of the insurer holding that Ivie, supra, was dis-
positive of the case. 
The same result should be reached in the present action. 
Barbara Brundage received PIP benefits from the plaintiff of approx-
imately $8313.80. She then received a judgment against the tort-
feasor, Jacklyn L. Kernan, in an amount of $21,600.00. In essence, 
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Ivie and Anderson hold that while an insured tort victim should 
-
not sue the tortfeasor for PIP payments already received, any 
judgment or award which is given to the insured tort victim 
is not recoverable by the victims insurer. Thus, while Ivie 
-
received $7,394000 in PIP payments from her insurer and her 
settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer was only $44,000oOO, 
she was also granted judgment for the $7,394000 paid jointly 
to her and her insurer, even though that amouµt was meant to be 
reimbursement for the PIP benefits paid by her insurero The 
same result followed in Anderson where the insured tort victim 
was awarded $2,000oOO meant to be PIP reimbursement to the insurer, 
Finally, the additional consideration of attorney's fees 
becomes relevant should the Court rule adversely to Mrs. Brundage, 
In Street vs. Farmer~. Insurance Exchange, 609 Po 2d 1343 (Utah 1980), , 
the Court held: 
"The general rule is that a subrogation insurance 
carrier must pay its fair share of -attorney's fees 
and costs if it has given notice and does nothing 
to assist in the prosecution of the claim." 
Therefore, should the Court choose to distinguish or 
overrule the ~ decision, the ruling against respondents -Ivie 
and Morgan would be subject to remand, in order to determine the 
benefit conferred on the no-fault carrier. See also Guaranty 
National Insurance Company vs. Morris, 611 P.2d 725, 737, (Utah 
1980)0 (This latter issue may be controlled by the case of~ 
vs. State Farm Insurance Company now pending before the Court. 
The Laub case was argued before the Court on the 14th day of June, 
19820) 
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CONCLUSION 
The threshold consideration presented in this appeal is 
whether respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan are properly before 
the Court. Respondents are of the opinion that personal jurisdiction 
was never obtained after their dismissal from the suit 0 Therefore, 
the errors assigned by Allstate following the dismissal of Ohio 
Casualty's claim should have no effect on Mrso Brundage and her 
attorneyso Furthermore, the errors assigned by Allstate prior to 
their dismissal involve only the rights of Ohio Casualty, which 
have been waived. Thus, respondents conclude that the current appeal 
is not properly before the Court. This argument is considered as 
being a form of special appearance, and the remainder of respondent's 
brief is provided only to protect Mrso Brundage under all eventualities. 
In addition, respondents are of the belief that the issue 
presented here was conclusively determined at the conclusion of the 
original action against the tortfeasor. Respondents believe that 
the appeal presented here is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, timeliness, mootness, and as an impermissible 
attempt to have one division of the Fourth District Court overrule 
another. 
Furthermore, respondents conclude that controlling case 
law in the State of Utah on the question of insurance arbitration 
and subrogation, would indicate that the appellant has no equitaole 
rights of reimbursement against Mrs. Brundage or her attorneys. 
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Finally, should the Court conclude that the present 
case is ripe for a decision on the merits, and that modification 
of Allstate vs. Ivie, supra, is in order, respondents would 
respectfully request that the Court apply the Sunburst Doctrine, 
and make the change in 
Respectfully submitted this 82. 
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